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Abstract
In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while 
others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional 
monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who 
coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents 
and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is 
uncertain and may vary from period to period. If the king wins, he establishes abso-
lute monarchy, but if the liberal wins he establishes a republic. Instead of fighting 
they may agree on a constitutional monarchy and share office rents and policy mak-
ing responsibilities. Whether constitutional monarchy is agreed depends on the mar-
ginal utilities from rents and policy preferences of the two actors, the sizes of the 
benefits from rents and policy, the rates by which they discount the future, and the 
probabilities of winning office. The contemporary European constitutional monarch 
as a ceremonial head of state who reigns but does not govern arises as a special case 
of the general model.
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Constitutional monarchy is a “system of government in which a monarch shares 
power with a constitutionally organized government. The monarch may be the de 
facto head of state or a purely ceremonial leader. The constitution allocates the rest 
of the government’s power to the legislature and judiciary.”1 The question of why 
some democratic countries adopted constitutional monarchy rather than repub-
lic, has received only scant attention in political economy. Scholars have inquired 
the factors which led to democratization, but not whether the democracy which 
has emerged is headed by a hereditary king serving for life or an elected president 
serving for a limited term. The leading theories of the transition from autocracy to 
democracy equate autocratic rule to policy making by a privileged and wealthy elite, 
and democracy with government chosen in competitive elections. They focus on 
how and why the disenfranchised poorer classes of the population obtain the right 
to vote, but they leave unexplored the question of why the office of the head of the 
state may remain in the hands of a hereditary king. The purpose of this paper is to 
fill this gap.
Building on earlier work by Congleton (2011), who introduced the king as an 
explicit player in the democratic transition, the present work considers constitutional 
monarchy as a form of power sharing between the king and a liberal challenger to 
royal authority. The king and the liberal coexist over a succession of discrete peri-
ods. In each period one of the two governs. Governing confers two broad benefits. 
First, office rents, that is, monetary rewards, perks, patronage, glory, and personal 
satisfaction associated with occupying a public post; second, the right to pursue 
one’s favourite policy. When the king is in power, he governs as an absolute mon-
arch2; he takes all office rents and chooses his preferred policy. If the liberal is in 
control, he abolishes the monarchy and introduces a republic3 where he takes all 
office rents and implements his most preferred policy. Who governs in each period 
is uncertain as the present winner of the conflict for power may retain or lose power 
in the future. Under constitutional monarchy the king and the liberal (a) share the 
rents from office and (b) implement a policy which combines their different policy 
preferences. Both the king and the liberal will choose the compromise solution of 
constitutional monarchy when each one of them derives a larger benefit than the 
2 Absolute government is “unlimited centralized authority and absolute sovereignty, as vested especially 
in a monarch or dictator. The essence of an absolutist system is that the ruling power is not subject to 
regularized challenge or check by any other agency, be it judicial, legislative, religious, economic, or 
electoral” (https:// www. brita nnica. com/ topic/ absol utism- polit ical- system, accessed 27-10-2020). Under 
an absolute ruler “The people are his subjects and he appoints officials to govern them.” (Finer, 1999: 
865).
3 “A form of government in which a state is ruled by representatives of the citizen body. Modern repub-
lics are founded on the idea that sovereignty rests with the people, though who is included and excluded 
from the category of the people has varied across history”  https:// www. brita nnica. com/ topic/ repub lic- 
gover nment, accessed 27-10-2020.
1 https:// www. brita nnica. com/ topic/ const ituti onal- monar chy, accessed 27-10-2020. According to Bogda-
nor (1997), the term ’constitutional monarchy’ originates from W. Dupré, a French writer, who wrote in 
1801 of ’La monarchie constitutionnelle’.
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product of the benefit conferred by his preferred pure form of government and the 
probability of success.
The paper explores whether there are values of the rent shares and the weights of 
policy preferences which, if chosen, will make the king and the liberal simultane-
ously better off in comparison to the pure forms of absolute monarchy or republic. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and the associated historical “Appen-
dix 1” offer a brief account of the development of constitutional monarchy in pre-
WWI European countries and its failure in others. Section 3 surveys the handful of 
studies which look at democratization and the retention or deposition of monarchy. 
Section 4 examines a formal model of constitutional monarchy as an institution of 
power sharing between the king and a liberal challenger; it identifies conditions for 
Nash, corner, and split-the-difference equilibriums, with various technical aspects 
of the model including attitudes to risk elaborated in “Appendices 2–4”. Section 5 
concludes.
2  European constitutional monarchies
Contemporary European constitutional monarchies and republics emerged out of 
medieval monarchical orders. By 1905 nineteen out of the then twenty-one inde-
pendent European states were constitutional monarchies: Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-
mark, Germany, Greece, Habsburg Empire (Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy), 
Italy, Luxembourg, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Ottoman Turkey, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; only France 
and Switzerland were republics.4 Despite constitutional limits, the early twentieth 
century European monarchs possessed important powers (Gilbert and Clay Large, 
2002). “Appendix 1” sketches the timeline of major constitutional events in each 
one of the above countries and in Albania briefly ruled by a king. Today, only eight 
European monarchies remain: Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Their kings and queens serve as 
constitutional heads of state performing ceremonial functions without policy mak-
ing powers.
The establishment of constitutional monarchy has been the cumulative result of 
introducing formal legal provisions and norms which replaced royal policy mak-
ing power with representative government, and the king became a figurehead of 
the state. Over time and following negotiations, kings agreed to constitutions which 
limited royal powers, defined citizen rights, granted parliaments powers on domes-
tic and foreign policy, and accepted that the cabinet of ministers must command a 
majority in parliament.5 More dramatically, and perhaps more traumatically, in 
4 1905 was chosen because of the three coincidental constitutional events: Norway declared independ-
ence from Sweden and adopted constitutional monarchy after a referendum; the Tsar Nicholas II was 
forced to grant Russia’s first constitution to end the revolutionary uprising; and Prince Nicholas of Mon-
tenegro granted a constitution to his countrymen.
5 For the potentially pivotal role of the monarchy in political modernization and the dilemmas confront-
ing the king see the classic work of Huntigton (1968).
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countries where the king failed to keep within the limits imposed by the constitu-
tion and the expectations for political liberalization, the monarchy was overthrown. 
Neither the transformation to constitutional monarchy, nor the birth of republic 
were one-shot events or linear developments. That is, challengers to the monarch 
sometimes won gradual concessions, often in exchange for more funds for the royal 
household, while in other occasions, kings managed to claw back powers for them-
selves and implemented more authoritarian rule.
Historically, different countries followed different paths towards establishing con-
stitutional monarchy; nevertheless, they also shared some broad common trends. 
During the nineteenth century, all European states founded after the Napoleonic 
wars were set up as kingdoms; in contrast all new European states emerging in the 
twentieth century after the two world wars were founded as republics. Newly inde-
pendent European monarchical states which were parts of existing European mon-
archies, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway, have retained their monarchical order 
until today. On the other hand, European states which won their independence from 
the Ottoman Empire, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, 
were founded as monarchies, but despite their differences regarding the existence 
of a domestic royal family,6 alliance with the victors of the two world wars,7 or reli-
gion,8 they all transitioned to republics.
In Spain and Greece, the swings between monarchy and republic and back have 
lasted until the third quarter of the twentieth century, as they both alternated between 
monarchy and republic and experienced bouts of military dictatorships (which were 
not controlled by their monarchs). Spain, where the institution of monarchy goes 
back to the medieval times, was briefly a republic during 1873–74, again in 1931–39 
and was ruled dictatorially during 1939–75; the Bourbon dynasty was restored in 
1975 and a constitutional monarchy was established. Greece started independent life 
as a monarchy in 1832. The monarchy was overthrown, and a republic prevailed 
during 1924–35. The monarchy was then restored, but the king was forced to leave 
the country after the 1967 military coup. Democracy was restored in 1974 and fol-
lowing a referendum the monarchy was abolished.9
9 France too offers an earlier example of recurring switches from monarchy to republic. From the 1789 
Revolution to the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870 the country went through two cycles of 
Bourbon monarchy, republic, dictatorship, and Napoleonic Empire.
6 See “Appendix 1” for details of the origins of their dynasties.
7 In WWI Greece, Romania and Serbia were aligned with the victorious Entente, Bulgaria with the 
defeated Central Empires. In WWII Greece was aligned with the victorious Allies. Bulgaria was aligned 
with the Axis Powers. At the beginning of WWII, the Regent of Yugoslavia submitted to the Axis, but 
was overthrown in a coup and the country was invaded and occupied by the Axis powers. In 1940 a coup 
forced the abdication of King Carol II of Romania and the country entered WWII on the side of the Axis. 
In 1944, the regime established by the coup was toppled by King Michael I and Romania switched to the 
Allies.
8 Albania was predominantly Muslim; Bulgaria, Greece and Romania were predominantly Christian 
Orthodox. Serbia was predominantly Christian Orthodox, but the Croats and the Slovenes who were 
incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia were predominantly Roman Catholics.
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3  A selective review of the literature on monarchy autocracy 
and democratization
Monarchical rule receives some attention in economic studies of dictatorship 
because autocracy is historically linked with monarchy. Tullock (1987: 1) writes 
“The difference between a dictatorship and a kingdom is … simply that the king-
doms tend to be hereditary … In actual government, however, there is not all that 
much difference between a hereditary ruler and a dictator … The word ‘autocracy’ 
encompasses both”.10 For Tullock, the main differences are that that dictatorships 
tend to be transitory, and succession becomes “an undignified squabble for power” 
(18; 136). On the other hand, longevity brings legitimacy (102; 105–107).11 He con-
siders support for an autocratic ruler as a function of time; the longer the ruler stays 
in power, the more legitimacy he has and the more likely he is to stay in power. 
Dictatorships then may survive by switching to hereditary control (17; 151).12 A 
long-existing monarchy is therefore seen as legitimate simply because “it has always 
been there”. Extending this line of thought, Kurrild-Klitgaard (2000) shows that 
by setting a fixed and clear rule of the game for power, hereditary succession pro-
vides stability. When contestants know who will succeed in the throne, their payoffs 
from fighting change, which limits the number of potential coalitions and produces 
a structure-induced equilibrium of peaceful succession.13 In turn, long-run stability 
enhances the legitimacy of the regime.
Typically, studies of democratization, the transformation from autocracy to 
democracy, pay no attention to the institution of kingship. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006), Boix (2015), Ansell and Samuels (2014), North et al. (2009), and Stasav-
age (2020) among others equate democracy with government by majority rule and 
a fully enfranchised population. Their point of departure is autocratic rule by royal 
dynasties or dictators, as the case maybe, and focus on the reasons for the exten-
sion of the franchise to poorer classes of the population. However, these works say 
nothing about the survival of the institution of monarchy after the establishment of 
democracy.
Congleton (2007, 2011 and 2013) is a partial exception to this generalization. The 
starting point is Medieval Europe where “the monarch rules but he is surrounded by 
a circle of semi-independent noblemen, jealous of their privileges and able if neces-
sary, to counterbalance the powers of the Crown…The king rules, but in council” 
10 See Wintrobe (1998) for an in-depth analysis of different types of autocrats.
11 Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1956) and North (1981) also offer similar arguments.
12 Brownlee (2007) notes that in republic-style autocracies, hereditary succession is the norm when no 
organizational mechanism for the choice of leader had been used before the death of a founding dictator, 
who pre-dates the foundation of the governing party.
13 Konrad and Skaperdas (2007) analyze the conclave and divide-and-rule succession rules. In the for-
mer as practiced by the Vatican the conclave of cardinals elects one of its members as the new pope, and 
all others who are not elected stay on as cardinals to the new pope, so that they still receive part of the 
rents from the regime. In the divide-and-rule regime after a leader dies his supporters fight for power and 




(Finer, 1999: 56). Congleton then explicitly introduces the king as a player in the 
policy making game and develops the “king-and-council” template  to study the 
game. In the king-and-council architecture, responsibilities for deciding policies are 
divided between a single person, the king, and a committee or council of noblemen, 
who advise the king and may have varying degrees of formal powers (advisory, veto 
or agenda-setting). The king-and-council form of governance emerges to exploit the 
benefits from specialization of labour when confronted with problems of informa-
tion on public policy issues and succession (Congleton, 2013; Tridimas, 2018).
In the king-and-council template the shares of policy responsibilities between 
the king and the council are not rigid but vary over time. This reflects the ideas 
of thinkers like Locke and Montesquieu, who in the long European transition from 
autocracy to democracy, conceived constitutional monarchy as a form of governance 
where the king has executive and even some legislative powers balanced by a coun-
cil-parliament. Congleton explains that the establishment of representative govern-
ment involved two largely independent developments; first, a shift of policy making 
powers away from the king and towards the council-parliament, and second, the par-
liament becoming more representative of the population following the extension of 
the suffrage. The shift of policy making power involved a sequence of piecemeal and 
largely peaceful bargains between the king and the parliament, where the king trades 
policymaking authority to parliament in exchange for new tax revenues. Typically, 
new tax revenues are needed when the country goes to war. Further, “the impor-
tance of parliamentary majorities tended to increase as national budgets increased 
and more disciplined national parties emerged” (Congleton, 2011: 474). Constitu-
tional exchanges are also most likely during changing circumstances as it was the 
case with the industrial revolution bringing rapid technological progress, new eco-
nomic opportunities, and social trends. In the same vein of constitutional exchanges, 
and starting from the medieval constitutional order, Young (2021) explains that rep-
resentation and limited government, and ultimately liberty, arose in Western Europe 
resulting from “exchanges of political property rights and changes in the rules of the 
game for governance.”14
Congleton (2011) shows that the developments of the constitutional monarchies 
of the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and, less obviously, of Germany up to and 
including the Weimar Republic, pre-WWII Japan, and the USA, are consistent with 
his theory of constitutional exchanges. However, Congleton does not examine the 
survival or demise of the institution of monarchy. One may nevertheless infer that in 
his account, the crown survives because the king has made sufficient concessions to 
14 Britain offers the archetypical example of the evolution towards constitutional monarchy (Bogdanor 
1997). In 1215 Magna Carta laid down the two fundamental principles that the monarch rules according 
to law and the rights of individuals take precedence over the personal wishes of the monarch. After the 
trauma of the 1642–51 civil war and Stuart restoration, the 1689 Glorious Revolution brought the abil-
ity of the Parliament to change the line of succession to the throne, and with the Bill of Rights limited 
the power of the sovereign against the Parliament to prevent abuses of power. In 1697 the Civil List Act 
made the sovereign dependent upon parliament for annual grants fixed at the beginning of each reign. 
Again, the 1701 Act of Settlement showed that the Parliament had the right to determine the succession 
to the throne and the conditions under which the Crown was to be held.
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the council-parliament which demands greater input into policy making. The present 
study expands and complements the work of Congleton.
Tridimas (2016) takes up the question of the causes of the overthrow of the 
monarchy distinguishing between proximate and fundamental causes. Historically, 
monarchies have been overthrown after war defeat, dissolution of the kingdom 
and decolonization (where new independent states repudiate the previous imperial 
order), revolution, and popular referendums, and often a combination of the above. 
However, these are only proximate causes for overthrowing the monarchy since the 
record is also full of cases where domestic conflict or military defeats did not end up 
with the removal of the monarchy. Proximate causes describe the sequence of events 
which lead to the fall of the monarchy and the rise of a republican order, which may 
be democratic or not, but the overthrow of the monarchy is attributed to fundamental 
causes which underpin the proximate ones. The institution of monarchy is funda-
mentally rejected if it loses its legitimacy, where legitimacy means that the mon-
archy is recognized to have the right to do what it does. The legitimacy of ancient 
monarchies was based on the divine status of the king. Medieval monarchies were 
“by the grace of god” too. With the transition to modernity following new scientific 
discoveries, rationalist thinking and the establishment of the nation-state, divine jus-
tification was replaced by the monarchy becoming a symbol of the unity and con-
tinuity of the community. In this setting, continuation and acceptance of the king 
rested on the lineage from the original monarch. However, if the monarchy loses its 
basis of acceptance, it is no longer legitimate. The monarchy may lose its legitimacy 
because of ethnic divisions, where a particular national group no longer recognizes 
the authority of the imperial ruler as legitimate; interference of the monarch in poli-
tics supporting a particular group or class, which destroys the role of the monarch 
as a unifying factor; corruption in the court which erodes the social cohesion role 
of the monarchy; and deep ideological shifts, like, for example, the virulent anti-
royalist ideology of communism.15 However, loss of legitimacy is only a necessary 
condition. Those who no longer recognize the king as legitimate must also be able to 
solve their collective action problem, organise against the monarch and have enough 
strength to overthrow the institution.
4  A formal model of constitutional monarchy
4.1  Model set‑up
The king and his challenger, where the latter according to Congleton (2011) and 
Tullock (1987) is in the council-parliament, engage in repeated interactions for con-
trolling the government, which brings office rents and the right to set policy. Instead 
15 “In … societies [where] the monarch monopolizes legitimacy, and the system is thus unable to adapt 
peacefully to the expansion of political power and the emergence of other sources of social initiative and 




of fighting, they may compromise and establish constitutional monarchy which 
subjects them to constraints accepted by both. The gradual evolution towards rep-
resentative government and constitutional monarchy reveals that there is a range of 
intermediate stages where the king and the liberal challenger possess different and 
changing shares of office rent and policy making power. It is these shares which are 
the focus of attention here.
The two opposing sides realise that open conflict produces only temporary win-
ners. That is, after a confrontation, which may be violent and disruptive, one side 
emerges victorious and is in control for a period. It may be able to beat off sev-
eral future attacks by the defeated side, but as circumstances change, the latter may 
grow stronger and at an opportune time it challenges successfully and wins power. 
The cycle is then repeated. The literature has shown that repeated interactions can 
generate compromises in the form of institutions of power sharing (Dixit, 2003; 
Rodrik, 2000; Tridimas, 2011). The power sharing arrangement means that the side 
which has won power gives up some of the benefits from office to the losing side, in 
exchange for the other side to reciprocate when in office. This trade off results in the 
side out of office suffering fewer losses in the long-run.
Thence, constitutional monarchy is modelled as a governance arrangement where 
the king and the liberal agree to share the rents from office and the authority over 
policy making. It is therefore a point in the two-dimension space of office rents and 
policy making. Nevertheless, the king and the liberal may have unequal shares and 
the king’s share of rents from office may differ from his share of input to policy 
making, as implied by the historical narrative. Since there is no higher authority to 
police the power sharing arrangement, it is viable only when it is a self-sustained 
equilibrium. That is, it makes both sides better off than the alternative of switching 
between absolute monarchy and republic. Contemporary European constitutional 
monarchies are therefore only one of the possible equilibrium points where, the king 
surrenders policy making powers and retains some rents from the office of the head 
of state, and the liberal challenger assumes policy making powers and consents to 
the king keeping the crown as head of state.
We assume a setting of two players stylistically called the king and the liberal 
challenger indexed by K and L respectively who coexist over an infinite succes-
sion of discrete periods. Each player is considered as a single actor abstracting from 
questions of the formation of coalitions (and division of spoils of power among their 
members; such issues are left for future research). In each period one of the two gov-
erns. As in Dixit (2003), we assume that if in one period the king prevails and gov-
erns as an absolute monarch there is a Π probability that the monarchy survives in 
the next period and a 1 − Π probability that the monarchy is overthrown and replaced 
by republic where the liberal governs. Similarly, under a republican order in one 
period, there is a Φ probability that the republic survives in the next period and a 
1 − Φ probability that the republic is overthrown and replaced by monarchy. That is, 
the government types are characterized by a Markov process of fluctuation between 
a monarchical and a republican regime with fixed switching probabilities. The prob-
abilities Π and Φ , depend on the military strengths of the king and the liberal, their 
financial resources and their legitimacy. For example, if the monarch is perceived as 
legitimate because of religious reasons, tradition, societal unity or simply a bulwark 
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against political extremism, then Π takes a high value. Throughout the main text 
we assume that both players are risk neutral as it is most often assumed in mod-
els of conflict (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007). The technical “Appendix” 4 extends 
the analysis to risk aversion assuming that the utilities of the players are negatively 
affected by the variance of the uncertain constitutional outcome.
Let Uj
i
 denote the static (period) utility and Vj
i
 the expected present discounted 
utility of player i = K, L under the constitutional order j = M,R . Let the discount 
factors of the king and the liberal be K and L respectively, where in general K ≠ L
.16 The expected discounted values of the utilities of the king and the liberal chal-
lenger can be expressed in the following recursive forms (Dixit, 2003; Rodrik, 
2000). 
Solving (1.1) and (1.2), we obtain the expected present discounted values of the 
utility of the king:
The expressions DKΦ ≡
1−KΦ
1+K (1−Π−Φ)
 and DKΠ ≡
K (1−Π)
1+K (1−Π−Φ)
 show respectively the 
discounted probabilities of the king to continue controlling the government and the 
king staying out of office. Similarly, solving (2.1) and (2.2) we derive the expected 
present discounted values of the utility of the liberal
As before, the expressions DLΠ ≡
1−LΠ
1+L(1−Π−Φ)




respectively the discounted probabilities of the liberal to continue controlling the 
government and the liberal staying out of office. Note also 
0 < DKΦ,DLΦ,DKΠ,DLΠ < 1 , and DKΦ − DLΦ = DLΠ − DKΠ 
(1.1)
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16 Although not necessary for the analysis which follows, if it is assumed that the king cares about 











> 0 . The difference DKΦ − DLΦ denotes the king’s dis-
counted probability differential of staying in office. Similarly, the difference 
DLΠ − DKΠ denotes the liberal’s discounted probability differential of staying in 
office.
The period utility of each player Uj
i
 depends on the size of office rent Y  and the 
policy chosen X . Policy choices are modelled using the standard spatial model. That 
is, the king and the liberal are assumed to have ideal policy points K∗ and L∗ respec-
tively and their utility losses increase the further away actual policy is from the ideal 
point; see Fig. 1.
We assume L∗ > K∗ with A = |L∗ − K∗| > 0 . We may then write 
UK = Y − (1 − )|K∗ − X| and UL = Y − (1 − )|L∗ − X| . The parameters  and 
−(1 − ) , and  and −(1 − ) , denote the marginal utility and marginal disutility of 
rent and policy losses of the king and respectively the liberal. It is differences in 
these marginal utilities which open the opportunity for mutually beneficial exchanges 
between the king and the challenger. For concreteness, we assume that the king’s 
marginal utility of rents is greater than that of the liberal, 𝜂 > 𝜃 , or equivalently, the 
liberal’s marginal utility of policy is greater than that of the king, 1 − 𝜃 > 1 − 𝜂.17 
The justification for this assumption is as follows. Kings seem to devote more time 
to their personal consumption and living standards than policy, partly because of 
their privileged upbringing and partly because they feel secure on the throne (Tull-
ock (1987: 120). Indeed, historically, monarchs hardly separated the private wealth 
of the royal family from the wealth of the crown as an institution of governance, an 
observation which leads to the standard practice of modelling the stationary-bandit 
ruler as maximizing his consumption treating the public treasury as an extension of 
his private wealth (McGuire & Olson, 1996; Olson, 1993). Further, in the historical 
process of democratization, challengers to kings sought to influence public policy 
rather than confiscate the assets of the throne, alluding that for the liberal the mar-
ginal utility from policy making exceeds that of rents from office.
Under absolute monarchy the king takes the entire office rent Y  and sets policy 
at his ideal point X= K∗ so the utilities of the king and the liberal are written as 
Fig. 1  Policy under different constitutional orders
17 “Appendix 2” shows that when η = θ the two players will never agree on a constitutional monarchy.
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UM
K
= Y  and UM
L
= −(1 − )A . Under republic the liberal takes the office rent and 
sets policy at his ideal point X= K∗ , so that the utilities of the king and the liberal 
are written as UR
K
= −(1 − )A and UR
L
= Y  . Substituting these values into (3) and 
(4) we have the reduced forms:
Under constitutional monarchy, indexed by C, the office rents are shared between 
the king and the liberal, while policy is set as a weighted average of their ideal 
points. The present values of their utilities are:
More specifically, (a) the king gets a 0 ≤  ≤ 1 share of office rents Y , while the 
liberal takes the rest 1 −  ; and (b) policy is set as a weighted average of the two 
ideal points X = K∗ + (1 − )L∗ , where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and 1 −  denote respectively 
the shares of the ideal policy points of the king and the liberal in the policy actu-
ally implemented. The instantaneous payoffs are then UC
K
= Y − (1 − )|K∗ − X| 
and UC
L
= (1 − )Y − (1 − )|L∗ − X| . From the definition of X we have 
|K∗ − X| = (1 − )A amd |L∗ − X| = A . Substituting into (5) and (6) we obtain
Figure 2 summarises the constitutional outcomes.
In sum, when compared to Congleton’s analysis, the model offers two innova-
tions; first, it explicitly models the repeated interactions between the king and the 
challenger, and second it models two different benefits from controlling the govern-
ment, office rents and policy.
4.2  Minimum acceptable loci of constitutional monarchy
Whether the king is better off with constitutional monarchy than absolute mon-


























Y − (1 − )(1 − )A
1 − K
(8)VCL =













 respectively. Substituting from (7) and (3), and 
(8) and (4), and denoting H ≡ Y + (1 − )A and G ≡ Y + (1 − )A the benefit of 
the king and the liberal from controlling the government, we have
To avoid conflict whose outcome is uncertain, the two players may accept con-
stitutional monarchy such that the shares of office rents and policy making simul-
taneously make them both better off, so that the resulting constitutional order is 
self-enforcing. This requires that the inequalities ΔK ≥ 0 and ΔL ≥ 0 hold simul-











GDLΦ − Y − (1 − )A
)
Fig. 2  Timeline of constitutional outcomes
18 We have not modelled conflict as an explicitly costly outcome (one which requires military expendi-
ture and destroys part of the rents obtained by the winner). This would have complicated the algebra 
without a concomitant increase in intuition; it would have also increased the appeal of the compromise 
solution of power sharing stacking the deck to its favour.
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the liberal aspires to the lowest possible  and  . For parameter values such that 
ΔK < 0 the king chooses confrontation rather than compromise on the hope of 
establishing absolute monarchy. Similarly, for parameter values such that ΔL < 0 
the liberal chooses conflict.
Solving ΔK = 0 we find the lowest values of  and  which lead the king to 
accept constitutional monarchy:
Graphically, the locus defined by (9’) is shown by the line KK in the (, ) 











 are respectively the vertical and horizontal intercepts of (9’). The line 
KK depicts the minimum payoff the king demands for agreeing to constitutional 
monarchy. It represents the king’s lowest indifference curve in the (, ) space. 
Points to the right of KK indicate higher payoffs because the king enjoys higher 
shares of rent and input into policy making. Its negative slope indicates the trade-
off between the share of the rent and the share of policy which the king demands 
to accept constitutional monarchy.
Similarly, solving ΔL = 0 we find the highest values of  and  which lead the 
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Graphically, the locus defined by (10’) is shown by the line LL in the (, ) 











 are respectively the vertical and horizontal intercepts of (10’). The line 
LL depicts the minimum payoff the liberal demands for agreeing to constitutional 
monarchy. It represents the liberal’s lowest indifference curve in the (, ) space, as 
it shows the maximum shares of rents and policy making prepared to grant to the 
king. Points to the left of LL indicate higher payoffs, because the liberal gets a 
larger part of the rent and a larger input into policy making. Again, its negative slope 
reflects the trade-off between the share of the rent and the share of policy input 
which the liberal is prepared to grant to the king for agreeing to constitutional mon-





 , that is, 
the KK line is steeper than the LL line.
As already said, since a constitutional monarchy equilibrium must be accept-
able to both the king and the liberal, it must be the case that ΔK ≥ 0 and ΔL ≥ 0 
hold simultaneously; otherwise, one or both players expect higher payoffs from their 
exclusive control of the government and reject power sharing. In addition, the com-
promise solution must be in the first quadrant to guarantee non-negative  and  val-
ues and inside the set of points defined by the KK and LL lines. There are three 
possibilities to consider: (1) The KK and LL cross each other inside the first 
quadrant as shown in Fig. 3. (2) The KK line lies below the LL line as shown in 
Fig. 4 and their intersection occurring in the second quadrant. These two cases yield 
several constitutional monarchy equilibriums worthy of attention. (3) The KK line 
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Fig. 4  KλKκ lies below  LλLκ: multiple Nash equilibriums. Split-the-difference equilibrium at DC
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quadrant. In this case there is no constitutional monarchy equilibrium as the king 
and the liberal will never agree to any rent and policy power sharing arrangement.
When the KK and LL cross each other inside the first quadrant at point E , as 
shown in Fig. 3, the constitutional monarchy equilibrium points are depicted by the 
shaded triangle ELK formed by the intersection of the KK and LL lines and 
the horizontal  axis. Existence of equilibrium requires that K , the vertical intercept 
of the KK , lies above L , the vertical intercept of the LL , and simultaneously K , 
the horizontal intercept of the KK , lies to the left of L , the horizontal intercept of 
the LL.
Equations (9’) and (10’) imply that simultaneous satisfaction of these two condi-
tions requires that
Since by assumption 𝜂 > 𝜃 which yields 1−𝜂
1−𝜃
< 1 and 𝜃
𝜂
< 1 , the necessary condi-




> 1 and 𝜂 + 𝜃 < 1 . Further, for K ≤ 1 and 
L ≤ 1 it must be HDKΦ ≤ (1 − )A and GDLΦ ≤ Y  respectively which we assume 
that they also hold. The points of the ELK triangle are all constitutional monarchy 
equilibrium points; they can be thought as the win-set of constitutional monarchy. 
They secure that for each side constitutional monarchy yields a higher payoff than 
the expected utility from the uncertain outcome of conflict and is therefore accepted 
by both sides. Hence, they render constitutional monarchy a self-enforcing equilib-
rium. Signing the constitutional document amounts to the two sides accepting to be 
bound by the agreed allocation of rents and policy weights.
Granting constitutions guaranteeing liberties, conceding policy powers and rents 
previously exclusively enjoyed by the king as described in the historical narrative, 















Fig. 5  KλKκ lies below  LλLκ: a constitutional monarchy equilibrium does not exist
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constitutional arrangements agreed in different polities at various moments are rep-
resented by different points of the triangle. Clearly, there are several rent and policy 
inputs shares which may form a viable constitutional monarchy, although at this 
level of generality we cannot determine which equilibrium prevails, or how a given 
country travels from one equilibrium to another. However, there is a range of points 
of particular interest; specifically, the Nash equilibrium and the figurehead-king 
equilibrium.
4.3  Constitutional monarchy: rent and policy shares under Nash equilibrium
The intersection of KK and LL , point E , depicts the Nash equilibrium obtained 
by solving the system of equations ΔK = 0 and ΔL = 0 for  and . This is the same 
solution derived by assuming that the two players determine  and  in a Nash bar-
gaining game, that is maximizing the function W = ln(ΔK(, )) + ln(ΔL(, )) . It 
corresponds to the solution of a non-cooperative game between the king and the lib-
eral where each player takes the choices of the other as given. It shows the minimum 
shares simultaneously acceptable to both players. These are:
The comparative static properties of ∗ and ∗ are presented in “Appendix 3”. The 
corresponding equilibrium shares of the liberal under constitutional monarchy are:
4.4  Rent shares under king‑as‑figurehead equilibrium
Obviously, the king would like a point to the right and further away from the EK 
side showing minimum acceptable shares. Similarly, the liberal would like a point to 
the left and further away from the EL side showing maximum shares to be granted. 
Thus, by choosing points inside the ELK triangle away from E towards the hori-
zontal side of the triangle, the king and the liberal can be better off. This implies 
that any point of the horizontal segment LK (excluding the vertices) represents a 
Pareto superior allocation for both players. But the coordinates of all points of the 
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has no policy making power. This is the essence of European-style modern constitu-
tional monarchy, where the king is a ceremonial head of state.19
If the constitutional monarchy equilibrium is at point K the king receives the 
minimum size of rents that he is prepared to accept, namely
On the other hand, if the constitutional monarchy equilibrium is at point L 
the king receives the maximum size of rents that the liberal is prepared to accept, 
namely
One may surmise that the larger the KL distance the more likely that the king 
and the liberal will succeed in establishing a constitutional monarchy upon negotia-
tion. This makes important to study the comparative static properties of the K and 
L ; they are shown in Table 1.
Analytically, when establishing a constitutional monarchy with the king as 
figurehead:
An increase in the size of office rents decreases the equilibrium share of rent 
accepted by the king, as the king is prepared to accept a smaller proportion of 
rents for the sake of securing a permanent stake of rents (row 1). On the contrary, 









Table 1  Comparative static properties of minimum and maximum king’s rent
Minimum king’s rent equilibrium (14) Maximum king’s rent equilibrium (15)




















































































































































19 Note that the Nash equilibrium (12.1) and (12.2) is a king-figurehead equilibrium when ∗ = 0 . Sub-

















equilibrium share of rent granted to the king to compensate for the removal of policy 
making power (row 2).
An increase in the king’s marginal utility of office rents decreases the minimum 
share of rent the king is prepared to accept, but leaves the maximum unaffected, 
since what matters for the king is rents (row 3). Analogously, an increase in the lib-
eral’s marginal utility of office rents leaves the minimum rent accepted by the king 
unaffected but decreases the maximum rent for agreeing to constitutional monarchy 
(row 4).
An increase in the king’s discount factor, meaning that the king is more patient, 
decreases the king’s minimum share of rent but leaves the maximum unaffected 
(row 5). The opposite is true for an increase in the liberal’s discount factor (row 
6). That is, a more patient king accepts a smaller proportion of rents in exchange 
for rent certainty. The importance of this comparative static result becomes appar-
ent when a person who was low in the line of succession to the throne and did not 
expect to become king or queen, after a fortunate turn of events finds himself or 
herself wearing the crown. It is also relevant to the case of a childless king who may 
have a different internal discount rate than a king with issue. Historically, parliamen-
tary authority increases in the event of the king not having clear heirs and the agree-
ment of the parliament is required to appoint a new sovereign. The 1689 accession 
of William III and Mary to the English throne is one of the best-known cases here; 
similar parliamentary assent was needed for the appointment of a foreign prince in 
the Balkan kingdoms previously ruled by the Ottoman Empire (see “Appendix 1”).
An increase in the probability that absolute monarchy continues increases the 
minimum and the maximum rent share of the king (row 7), but the opposite holds if 
the probability that the republic survives (row 8), as intuition suggests.
4.5  Split‑the‑difference cooperative constitutional monarchy equilibrium
When the king and the liberal are willing and able to coordinate, they may negoti-
ate to split the difference between the maximum and minimum payoffs represented 
by K and L , and agree the allocation represented by point C , the midpoint of the 
KL segment. Since KC = CL , to the right of C , the king gets more utility at the 
expense of the liberal and vice versa to the left of C . The midpoint then emerges as 
the cooperative constitutional monarchy equilibrium securing the highest negotiated 
utility for each player. The share of the rent awarded to the king is
The comparative static properties of the equilibrium values of C mirror those of 
(15) and the negative of (14) causing some of the signs to be ambiguous; they are 
shown in “Appendix 3”.
To complete the analysis, we return to Fig. 4 where it is noted that when the KK 
line of the minimum acceptable combinations of  and  lies below the LL line 
of the liberal’s minimum concessions, the constitutional monarchy equilibrium is 
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As before, the segment KL shows the equilibrium points where the king acts as 
head of state without policy powers, and C the midpoint between the horizontal 
intercept K and L represents the cooperative split-the-difference equilibrium.
However, it is uncertain whether a self-sustained constitutional monarchy equilib-
rium always exists. If either, or both, of the relevant inequalities (11) are not satis-
fied, then the king and the liberal fail to agree on the power sharing agreement. As 
shown in Fig. 5, ex ante the two sides are better off by opting for open confrontation 
to establish their preferred constitutional order. This result formalizes the conflict 
between monarchy and republic and their changing fortunes over time.
5  Conclusions
The purpose of this study has been to examine how constitutional monarchy may 
emerge, if at all. Historically, the shift from a ruling king to a reigning king, or even 
complete abolition of monarchy, has been a gradual process involving a series of 
reversible steps, some of them bolder than others, towards limiting the policy mak-
ing power of the monarch. Equally important, the timing and speed of the transfor-
mation have differed across different countries.
The inquiry started from the premise that a hereditary king and a liberal chal-
lenger fight for control in a game spanning over time. Holding power confers two 
types of benefits, office rents and the right to decide policy. Stylistically, under abso-
lute monarchy (republic) the king (liberal) takes all rents and implements his most 
preferred policy. But the outcome of the confrontation between the king and the lib-
eral in each period is uncertain; absolute monarchy may be succeeded by republic 
excluding the king from the spoils of office, or the republic may be overthrown by 
the royalist side. Constitutional monarchy is an institution of power sharing. In gen-
eral, the compromise solution of power sharing involves the king obtaining a pro-
portion of rents and having his ideal policy only partly reflected in the policy imple-
mented, and similarly for the liberal challenger. The study set up a model of repeated 
interactions between the king and the liberal and identified conditions where the 
payoffs of both the king and the challenger under constitutional monarchy are higher 
than those from absolute monarchy for the king and republic for the liberal.
The formal investigation shows that there exists a range of parameter values 
where constitutional monarchy secures higher individual payoffs for both players 
than the alternative constitutional orders. The corresponding equilibrium shares 
depend on the marginal utilities from rents and policy preferences of the two actors, 
the sizes of the benefits from rents and the right to decide policy, the rates by which 
the future is discounted, and the probabilities of winning and retaining office. The 
comparative static properties showed how when circumstances change the shares 
awarded to the king and the liberal change. The modern Western European type of 
constitutional monarchy where the king is the head of state without policy powers 
emerges as a possible solution of the model, which under the conditions examined 
maximizes the expected payoffs of both the king and the liberal. However, the model 
also shows that there exist parameter values where either or both players are better 
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off (in an expected sense) by rejecting the compromise solution and opting for con-
flict on the hope of gaining exclusive control of the government. It is therefore pos-
sible to claim that the model offers a sufficiently general explanation of how in the 
transition to democracy some European countries retained their monarchs as heads 
of state while others established republican orders.
Appendix 1: Timeline of European monarchies and selected 
constitutional events
Albania Monarchy: 1928–1939
1913: Independence from Ottoman rule; William of Wied, a German prince, 
selected as Prince.
1914: William of Wied expelled.
WWI: State collapses after invasion by Austria and then Italy & Serbia.
1924: Ahmed Bey Zogu, a tribal chieftain, wins power.
1928: President Zogu declares himself king Zog I.
1939: Occupied by Italy; Albanian monarchy ended.
Belgium Monarchy: 1830–
1830: Independence from the Kingdom of Netherlands declared
1831: Constitution adopted; Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld selected as King.
1893: Constitutional reform
1899: Revision of the Constitution
1921: Revision of the Constitution
1950: Referendum reaffirms constitutional monarchy.
Bulgaria Monarchy: 1878–1946
1878: autonomy from Ottoman rule; Alexander of Battenberg selected as Prince.
1886: Alexander abdicates after pro-Russian coup; Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg & 
Gotha selected as Prince (reigning dynasty until the end of monarchy)
1908: Kingdom proclaimed.
WWI: Defeated; Ferdinand abdicates in favour of his son Boris.
1935: King imposes dictatorship.
1944: Red Army enters Bulgaria; Communists seize power.
1946: Monarchy abolished after referendum.
Denmark Monarchy: Medieval-
1665: Constitution based on absolute monarchy and hereditary succession formal-
ized
1849: New constitution introduces constitutional monarchy and bicameral legisla-
ture
1866: Constitutional revision enhances the powers of the monarch
1915: Constitutional revision grants voting rights to women
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1953: Constitutional revision establishes unicameral legislature and basic human 
rights.
France Monarchy: Medieval-1792; 1804–1848; 1852–1870
1589: Henry IV Bourbon ascends to the throne (reigning dynasty until the end of 
monarchy)
1789: French Revolution
1791: Constitutional monarchy adopted.
1792: King Louis XVI guillotined; Republic declared.
1792: “Great Terror”
1795: New constitution establishing government by the “Directory”
1799: Napoleon overthrows Directory
1804-1815: First Empire – Napoleon I
1815-1848: Bourbon restoration
1830: King Charles X abdicates after popular uprising; Louis-Philippe becomes 
King.
1848: Revolution; Louis-Philippe abdicates; Republic declared.
1852-1870: Second Empire - Napoleon III
1870: Third Republic declared after defeat in the Franco-Prussian War
1875: Republican constitution adopted.
Germany Monarchy: 1861–1918
1815: German Confederation founded (successor of the Holy Roman Empire, 962-
1806); several German principalities adopt constitutions.
1819: Karlsbad Decrees suppress liberal and nationalistic tendencies.
1848–1849: Frankfurt Constitutional Convention fails to receive support for a uni-
fied Germany.
1848: Prussia adopts constitution.
1850: Prussian constitution revised.
1866: North German Confederation founded under the control of Prussia.
1871: Unification of Germany under Prussia; new Federal Constitution.
1918: Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicates after WWI defeat; transition government formed.
1919: Republican Constitution of Weimar approved.
Greece Monarchy: 1832–1924; 1936–1967
1832: Independence from Ottoman rule; Otto Wittelesbach, a Bavarian prince, 
selected as King.
1843: Otto forced to grant constitution.
1862: Otto deposed.
1863: George Glucksburg, a Danish prince, selected as King (reigning dynasty until 
the end of monarchy).
1864: New constitution proclaims constitutional monarchy.
1911: Constitution revised (after 1909 military pronunciamento)
1915–1917: National schism between Royalists and Liberals.





1946–1949: Civil War, Nationalist forces defeat Communists.
1952: New authoritarian constitution.
1967–1974: military dictatorship; 1967: King leaves Greece.
1974: Democracy restored; Monarchy abolished after referendum.
Habsburg Monarchy: Medieval-1918
(Austria, Hungary, Czech lands, Slovakia).
1526: Maximilian Habsburg succeeds Charles V Holy Roman Emperor
1806: End of Holy Roman Empire
1848: Revolution; Ferdinand I abdicates
1849: Emperor Francis Joseph rejects constitutional document proposed by legis-
lature.
1862: First fundamental rights: Law on Personal Freedom; Law on the Right of 
the Home
1867: Austria Empire transformed to Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary; 
December constitution; First Charta of fundamental Rights; State Basic Law on 
citizen rights
1918: End of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; proclamation of Republic.
Italy Monarchy: 1862–1946
1861: Constitution of Sardinia Piedmont (granted in 1848 by King Carlo Alberto) 
becomes the constitution of unified Italy under Victor Emanuel II of Savoy
1922: Victor Emanuel III endorses fascist Mussolini as prime minister.
1943: Victor Emanuel III dismisses Mussolini’s government, but Nazi Germany 
reinstates it.
1946: Victor Emanuel III abdicates in favour of his son Umberto II.
1946: Monarchy abolished after referendum.
Luxembourg Monarchy: 1839-
1815: Autonomous Grand Duchy
1839: Fully sovereign and in personal union to the king of the Netherlands
1867: Full independence gained.
1868: Constitution adopted.
1890: Dukedom passes to Adolph of the House of Nassau-Weilburg (reigning 
dynasty).
Montenegro Monarchy: 1878–1918
1878: Independence from Ottoman rule with Nikola Petrovic-Njegos as Prince.
1905: Constitution granted.
1910: Nikola proclaimed King.
1918: Serbia annexes Montenegro and deposes Nikola (end of WWI); Montenegro 
becomes part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
The Netherlands Monarchy: 1648-
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1581: Act of Abjuration of the Estates-General declaration of independence from 
Spain.
1648: Independence of the Republic of United Provinces from Spain formalized.
1814: Proclamation of Prince Frederic William as king (reigning dynasty). Founda-
tion of the Kingdom of the Netherlands




1983: Constitution thoroughly revised
Norway Monarchy: 1905-
1814: Constitution adopted, following the defeat of Napoleon.
1851: Constitution amended.
1884: Constitution amended: Establishment of Parliamentarism.
1897: Constitution amended: Prohibition of Jesuits and Monastic orders abolished.
1905: Independence from Sweden; constitutional monarchy adopted after referen-
dum; Prince Carl of Denmark selected as King taking the name Haakon VII (reign-
ing dynasty)
Ottoman Turkey Monarchy: Medieval-1922
1383: Ascendance of Osman dynasty to the throne (reigning dynasty until the end of 
monarchy)
1876: Constitution granted by Sultan Abdul Hamid II bowing to domestic pressures.
1878: Constitution suspended.
1908: Young Turks revolution reactivates constitution.
1922: End of Empire after WWI defeat
Portugal Monarchy: Medieval-1910
1640: Independence from Spain; John Braganza becomes King (reigning dynasty 
until the end of monarchy)
1822: Constitution granted by John VI.
1826: New constitution by Pedro IV
1828-1834: Civil War over royal succession won by Queen Maria against Regent 
Miguel, her uncle.
1834: Maria II restored to the throne
1838: New constitution
1908: King Carlos and his son and heir Luis Filipe assassinated by republicans
1910: King Manuel II flees after republican military revolt.
Romania Monarchy: 1871–1947
1862: Autonomy from Ottoman Empire under Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza
1866: Cuza overthrown and replaced by Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (reign-
ing dynasty until the end of monarchy); Constitution granted
1878: Fully independent
1923: New democratic constitution coming to effect
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1938: New constitution introduces the personal dictatorship of King Carol II
1947: Monarchy overthrown when the Communists took control
Russia Monarchy: Medieval-1917
1613: Michael Romanov becomes King (reigning dynasty until the end of monar-
chy)
1825: Decembrist Revolt of army officers seeking constitutional government 
defeated
1867: Abolition of serfdom
1905: Tsar Nicholas II grants constitution after popular revolt, but government 
remains authoritarian
1917-March: Tsar Nicholas II abdicates
1917-November: Bolsheviks overthrow provisional government and establish Com-
munist rule
1918: Russia, defeated in WWI; royal family executed
Serbia/Yugoslavia Monarchy: 1871–1945
1817: Autonomy from Ottoman Empire; the domestic Houses of the Obrenovic and 
the Karadjordjevic fight each other and alternate on the throne.
1835: Constitution granted by Milos Obrenovic.
1838: New authoritarian constitution under Ottoman pressure.
1869: New constitution upon regency of Milan Obrenovic.
1878: Fully independent
1888: New liberal constitution granted by Milan Obrenovic.
1903: New liberal constitution granted by Peter I Karadjordjevic
1918: Yugoslavia established as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, under 
the Serbian king who also took the crown of Montenegro
1929: King Alexander Karadjordjevic bans national political parties
1945: Monarchy overthrown
Spain Monarchy: Medieval-1873; 1874–1931; 1975-
1526: Philip I Habsburg succeeds Charles V Holy Roman Emperor
1812: Constitution granted by Jose Bonaparte.
1814: Constitution revoked by Ferdinand VIII.
1820: Constitution of 1812 reinstated.
1824: Constitution revoked.
1837: New liberal constitution granted by Isabella II.
1868: Isabella deposed.
1870-73: Amadeo Savoy King
1873-1874: Republic
1874: Monarchy restored; Alfonso XII, son of Isabella II, becomes King.
1876: New constitution
1931: King Alfonso XIII overthrown
1931-1939: Republic
1936-1939: Civil War; Nationalist forces defeat Republicans.
1939-1975: Franco dictatorship
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1975: Monarchy restored, Juan Carlos, grandson of Alfonso XIII becomes King.
1978: New constitution
Sweden Monarchy: Medieval-
1523: Sweden secedes from the Scandinavian Kalmar Union of Denmark, Sweden, 
and Norway; Gustav Vasa becomes king of Sweden.
1544: Hereditary succession formalized.
1594: Sovereign required to take oath of accession.
1617: Formal establishment of four-chamber parliament
1634: Constitution formalized (First instrument of government)
1680: Revised instrument of government allows king Charles XI to claw back pow-
ers.
1720: New liberal constitution
1772: Constitutional reform shift authority back to the king
1809: New constitutional revision re-establishes powers of the parliament.
1866: Parliamentary reform establishing a two-chamber parliament.
1969: Single-chamber parliament established.
1975: Unification of fundamental constitutional laws
Switzerland Independent Confederation: 1648-
United Kingdom Monarchy: Medieval-
1215: Magna Carta accepted by King John.
1265: 2nd De Montfort parliament becomes the origin of the House of Commons.
1414: House of Commons on equal footing with the House of Lords in passing leg-
islation.
1534: Act of Supremacy – split from Vatican and foundation of Anglican Church.
1642-51: Civil War
1649-1659: Commonwealth of England
1660: Monarchy restored.
1688: Glorious Revolution
1689: English Bill of Rights; William III and Mary ascend to the throne.
1701: Act of Settlement restricts succession to nearest Protestants.
1714: George I, Elector of Hanoverian succeeds to the throne (reigning dynasty).
1714–1911: Gradual shift of policy making from the king to parliament.
1911: Veto power of the House of Lords ends.
Notes:
The Table lists European countries under monarchical rule which despite ter-
ritorial changes are recognizable today.
The list excludes: (1) Poland because it ceased to exist after the 1795 third par-
tition between Habsburg-Austria, Prussia, and Russia. (2) Baltic, German, Ital-
ian and Spanish kingdoms, Scotland and Ireland, duchies and other principali-
ties ruled by hereditary aristocratic families which by the Nineteeth century had 




“Medieval” signifies that the origins of a country’s monarchy are in the medieval 
times; see Young (2021) for the emergence of medieval kingships after the collapse 
of the Western Roman Empire
“Constitutional reform” indicates that the parliament takes policy powers from 
the king (unless otherwise specified), but description of suffrage reforms is omitted.
Source: Author’s compilation from the following: BBC timeline of Country pro-
file, various countries; Congleton (2011); Encyclopedia Britannica, various coun-
tries; International Constitutional Law website: http:// www. servat. unibe. ch/ icl/; 
Wikipedia, various countries.
Appendix 2: When the king and the liberal have identical marginal 
utilities of rents  = 
In this case the loci of accepting constitutional monarchy of the king and the liberal 
are respectively
That is, they are parallel lines with different intercepts. Since DKΦ − DLΦ > 0 
[see the discussion following Eq. (2.3)], the KK line is entirely above the LL line 
implying that the two players will never agree to set up a constitutional monarchy.
Appendix 3: Comparative static properties of constitutional 
monarchy equilibriums
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Appendix 4: Introduction of risk aversion
We assume that the utility wj
i
 of player i = K, L, under the constitutional order 
j = M,R , monarchy or republic, depends on the mean i
j
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The i parameter reflects risk aversion, that is, disutility from the variance of the 
constitutional outcome. The recursive forms of the expected discounted utilities are 
written as follows.
The mean of utility of the king with a Π probability that the absolute mon-




+ (1 − Π)VR
K
. The variance of the king’s util-




















)2 . Working in a similar way 























Upon substituting and manipulating (17) and (18) yield
Similarly (19) and (20) yield
However, at this level of generality, the quadratic equations do not provide 




 required to compare the payoffs under 
absolute and constitutional monarchy. To proceed we assume that the probability 
of a constitutional order continuing is the same for the king and the liberal, so that 
Π = Φ = P . Upon manipulating we obtain
Subtracting (21) and (22) from (7) and (8), the certain payoffs from constitutional 
monarchy respectively, we obtain the following loci of the king’s minimum accepta-
ble trade-off between  and  and the liberal maximum concession trade-off between 
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It is clear from the above, that introduction of risk aversion decreases the val-
ues of the horizontal intercepts, points 1 and 2 of the Fig. 3. Although this has an 
ambiguous effect on the size of the region where constitutional monarchy, the infer-
ences gained from the risk neutrality model remain the same.
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